Jingling Luojia Finance Seminar: Fall Corporate Finance Workshop, 2019

武汉大学经济与管理学院经管学院金融系

Finance Department, Economics and Management School, Wuhan University

一、议程(Schedule)

时间(Time)：2019/11/23

场地(Venue)：A511

二、报告人及文章摘要

1.胡聪慧（对外经济贸易大学副教授）

个人介绍：胡聪慧，对外经济贸易大学国际商学院副教授，北京大学光华管理学院金融学博士。研究领域为行为金融、资本市场与公司财务，致力于从投资者行为偏误、市场摩擦等非基本面因素的角度理解资产价格和公司财务决策。近年来，在Journal of Corporate Finance、Journal of Banking and Finance、《管理世界》、《金融研究》、《经济学(季刊)》、《会计研究》等国内外期刊上发表论文十余篇。主持并参与多项国家自然科学基金项目、上海证券交易所联合研究计划。曾荣获“惠园优秀青年学者”、全国商务财会论文三等奖、全国博士生学术会议（金融论坛）优秀成果特等奖等荣誉。

论文题目(Title)：Cues and Stock Preferences: Evidence from Natural Experiments

论文摘要(Abstract)：Do investors’ stock preferences vary with external cues? We hypothesize that successful lottery-type experiences increase investors’ gambling preferences by increasing the accessibility of tail returns and activating the desire to make a quick buck. By exploiting the randomized distribution of IPO shares in China as a natural experiment, we indeed find that, compared to matched control investors, those investors who were allocated IPO shares (lottery winners) substantially shift their non-IPO portfolios toward lottery-type stocks over the three months subsequent to the distribution. This effect is more pronounced for winning IPO lotteries with lower winning rates or larger issue-price discounts. Moreover, lottery winners experience a decrease in their portfolio return by 1% within the three months subsequent to the distribution relative to matched control investors, which is largely in proportion to increases in gambling behaviors. Our findings are not explained by the house money effect or wealth effect. Overall, our study suggests that lottery-type cues play a critical role in shaping investors’ gambling preferences in stock markets.

2.何潇潇（西南财经大学金融学院 助理教授）

个人简介(Bio)：西南财经大学金融学院副教授，毕业于香港城市大学，研究领域为公司金融，公司治理，企业经理人。一篇文章被Journal of Corporate Finance接收，参与一项国家自然科学基金研究项目。

文章题目(Title)：Government Procurement and Earnings Management

文章摘要(Abstract)：Previous studies have found that external monitories can significantly affect firms’ reporting practice. In this paper, we test whether the presence of the largest customer in the United State—the federal government – affects firms’ financial reporting decisions. Our empirical results suggest that there is a significant decrease in firms' earnings management activities among federal contractors comparing with non-contractors. In addition, our cross-sectional analysis indicates that the monitoring effect of the federal government on federal contractors’ earnings management serves as a substitute for internal corporate governance.

3.高昊宇（中国人民大学 副教授）

个人简介(Bio)：2016年博士毕业于中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院和香港城市大学经济金融系，分别获得管理学博士学位和金融学博士学位。同年9月加入中央财经大学，任职金融学助理教授；2019年9月调入中国人民大学，任职金融学副教授。研究兴趣主要集中在公司金融、金融中介与金融市场、中国资本市场等方面，他的论文已经发表或接受发表在Review of Financial Studies (RFS), Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (JFQA)、《金融研究》和《中国管理科学》等国内外金融学顶级刊物。他的多篇工作论文分别被多个国际和国内金融学顶级会议收录，比如美国金融学年会(AFA)，北美财务金融年会(SFS Cavalcade)，NBER工作论文，中国国际金融年会(CICF)，亚洲金融经济年会(ABFER)等。他的论文曾获得12届亚太金融市场年会（2017,首尔）和31届亚洲金融学年会（2018,东京）最佳论文奖。他是Review of Financial Studies (RFS), International Review of Finance(IRF), Journal of Financial Services Research(JFSR), Accounting and Finance (A&F),《管理科学学报》,《金融论坛》等杂志审稿人。此外，他还主持一项国家自然科学基金青年基金项目，参与多项国家自然科学基金重点课题，并多次参加银监会、国家开发银行、中国银行、东方资产管理公司等咨询课题合作项目。

文章题目(Title)：What Do A Billion Observations Say About Distance and Relationship Lending?

文章摘要(Abstract)：Using a large sample of the locations of bank branches and corporate borrowers in China, we measure lender-borrower geographic proximity and find a nontrivial amount of distant lending. Banks overcome great physical distance to borrowers by collecting soft information via interfirm network. We use novel data on monthly internal loan ratings for each loan to directly measure soft information by tracing whether banks downgrade ratings before delinquency. When distant borrowers are connected to banks’ local borrowers, banks can predict delinquency events more accurately. This effect is more pronounced for small and medium enterprises. Consequently, connected borrowers’ delinquency rates are lower.

4.周彤(中山大学岭南学院 助理教授)

个人简介(Bio)：周彤博士毕业于香港大学，研究领域为实证与理论资产定价、创新经济学、中国影子银行问题。其工作论文曾受邀在多个高水平学术会议做报告，包括American Finance Association、SFS Cavalcade、中国青年经济学者论坛等。目前有四篇论文于《Management Science》和《经济研究》等期刊做二审修改。

文章题目(Title)：理财产品市场的流动性配置效应研究——基于理财产品投资收益税改政策的准自然实验

文章摘要(Abstract)：融资约束是制约企业发展的主要问题之一，而理财产品市场正日益发挥满足企业融资需求的作用——超过60%的银行理财产品通过投资债权资产的方式为市场提供流动性。本文基于各省对于理财产品非保本投资收益的税制差异，以2016年财政部关于取消对该投资收益征税的统一政策改革作为准自然实验，利用双重差分和三重差分模型检验了理财产品市场的流动性配置效应。研究表明，税改政策激励了企业购买更多理财产品而减少现金持有，且这种现象在融资成本较低、主营业务占比较低以及发展空间较小的企业更为明显。更为重要的是，理财产品市场的发展对实体经济的发展产生了积极的溢出效应：那些融资约束较强的企业获得了更多的短期债务融资、降低了融资成本，并且融资约束的缓解促进了相关企业的实体经营投入，实现了理财产品市场的流动性配置功能。

5.沈思晨（武汉大学经济与管理学院 助理教授）

个人简介(Bio)：沈思晨博士2019年毕业于香港大学，研究领域为公司金融，公司治理，企业社会责任。其工作论文曾受邀在多个高水平学术会议做报告，包括American Finance Association、Financial Management Association，SFS Cavalcade Asia-Pacific、中国国际金融年会等。

文章题目(Title)：Political Connection and Corporate Environment Protection

文章摘要(Abstract)：We provide direct evidence on the influence of political connections on corporate environment protection, using the exogenous setting of File 18 enforced by China’s central government. File 18 restricts government officials from serving as directors in corporates. We find that firms are more environmentally friendly after losing political connected independent directors. This effect is more pronounced for firms operating in poor areas, with worse corporate governance or greater financing needs. Our results show thatpolitical connections reduce the risks of authority investigations on unsustainable operations for political connected firms and reduce their incentive to be more environmental responsible.

6.战昕彤（香港中文大学 助理教授）

个人简介(Bio)：Prof. Xintong (Eunice) Zhan is an Assistant Professor of Finance and Real Estate at The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK). She is also a Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) and a Chartered Alternative Investment Analyst (CAIA). Before joining CUHK, she was an Assistant Professor of Finance at Erasmus University Rotterdam. She received her Ph.D. in finance from The Chinese University of Hong Kong in 2016 and B.A. in finance from Guanghua School of Management, Peking University in 2012. She has published multiple papers in Management Science.

文章题目(Title)：Options Trading and Corporate Debt Structure

文章摘要(Abstract)：Options trading activity can enhance informational efficiency of underlying securities by helping to complete markets and by stimulating information production that leads to informed trades. Recent empirical studies find evidence suggesting that enhanced informational efficiency from options trading translates into higher firm values by allowing for a more efficient allocation of firm resources. In this paper, we develop and test the hypothesis that, in addition to a more efficient allocation of firm resources, options trading also enhances firm value through a financing channel, by promoting a debt structure that relies more on public debt and less on more costly bank financing. Consistent with both an information channel (where increased informational efficiency reduces the demand for the superior ability of banks to access and process private information) and a governance channel (where enhanced informational efficiency reduces the demand for bank lender governance) we find that bank loan issuance and the ratio of bank loans to total debt are negatively related to option listing and options trading volume.