Theme：Ambiguous Persuasion in Contests

Lecturer：Xin Feng,Business School of Nanjing University

Time：2022.05.19 14:00

Site：Tecent meeting 414-365-596

  Abstract:

  We study optimal information disclosure via an ambiguous persuasion approach in a two-player contest. The designer can precommit to an ambiguous device to influence the uninformed contestant's belief about his opponent' s private type. We fully characterize the optimal ambiguous information structures when players are maxmin expected utility (MMEU) maximizers. Depending on the prior, it is optimal either to induce maximal ambiguity or to simply use deterministic information policies. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which an effort-maximizing organizer can benefit strictly more from using ambiguous persuasion than from using the optimal Bayesian device.

  Introduction to the lecturer：

  Xin Feng is an associate professor at nanjing University Business School and a PhD in economics at the National University of Singapore. The main research fields are applied micro theory, including auction theory, competition theory, information design, etc. Results published (with acceptance) in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Journal of Public Economics, International Journal of Game Theory, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Economic Inquiry, Economics Letters, etc.