Abstract:We examine whether changes to corporate governance resulting from board reforms affect corporate tax behavior. While the connection between corporate governance and tax behavior has been the subject of intense interest in the literature, a lack of exogenous variation in governance has hampered inferences. Our inquiry exploits a set of major board reforms that capture shocks to board reforms for firms in 31 countries. The results indicate that corporate tax avoidance decreases significantly following major board reforms. We find that the influence of board reforms on corporate tax behavior is stronger in firms with relatively higher agency conflicts and more opaque information environments.

DOI：https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-021-09660-2 

该文在2022年8月21日在线发表于《Review of Accounting Studies》。该期刊为国际五大顶级会计学术期刊之一，也是商学院国际顶级期刊目录FT50期刊之一，是我院A-类期刊。该期刊致力于发表对于会计学科有重要贡献的会计学理论、实证与实验文章。