讲座题目：Short Selling and Politically Motivated Negative Information Hoarding: Evidence from a Controlled Experiment

　　报告人：邓小虎

　　报告时间：2017年5月22日(周一)10:00—11:30

　　报告地点：经管院B251

　　主办单位：数理经济与数理金融系

　　摘要：Extant literature documents that managers have an incentive to hoard bad news due to political concerns. In this paper, we test the proposition that short selling has an attenuating effect on the politically motivated suppression of bad news. We examine the stock price behavior of Chinese public firms around two highly visible political events - meetings of the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and Two Sessions (The National People’s Congress Conference and The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) from 2002-2014, and find that political bad news hoarding has been reduced after short selling becomes available. We establish causality by relying on a difference-in-differences approach based on a controlled experiment of short selling regulation changes in China. We also find this attenuating effect is more pronounced in firms with stronger political connection (higher state ownership and larger size) and higher accounting opacity, which further confirms our finding. This study sheds new light on the real effects of short sellers on political impact on capital market.

　　简介： 2007年毕业于武汉大学经济与管理学院，获得管理学学士学位;2016年毕业于孟菲斯大学，获得金融学博士学位。2016-2017年度任教于Ohio University, 并将于2017年9月任职澳大利亚University of Tasmania金融学助理教授。研究领域公司金融、实证资产定价、市场微观结构等。